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Do Unpatented Oil Shale
Mining Claims Exist?
By MAURICE T. REIDY*
The subject of this article is constipation. Webster's dictionary
defines "constipation" as a "state of the bowels in which evacuations
are infrequent and difficult." Another definition of constipation in
Webster is "costiveness," and "costiveness" means "reserved; slow
or stiff in expression or action." In applying these definitions to the
problem of unpatented oil shale mining claims, one can readily see
that evacuations of oil shale are, to say the least, infrequent and
difficult, and the attitude of the United States government relative
thereto is reserved or slow in expression or action.
This article is limited to the status of unpatented oil shale
mining claims. No definite conclusions will or can be drawn and
no binding authority can be cited. The conclusions will be reached
in numerous cases pending before the Department of the Interior
and the courts. In fact, if you walk into the clerk's office of the
United States District Court for Colorado to find the cases pending,
all you need to do is mention "oil shale cases" and one of the clerks
will deliver a group of files to you. Some of the cases have their
own little wrinkles, but the principal problem in most of the cases
is the one which will be discussed in this article.
The problem may best be phrased in the question, "Does such
a thing as a valid unpatented oil shale mining claim exist?" The
answer to this question will ultimately determine the ownership of
many thousands of acres of potentially valuable lands in Colorado,
Utah, and Wyoming. For this reason, the final answer will probably
come only from the United States Supreme Court.
I.

GENERAL MINING LAW APPLICABLE

We must first, therefore, review generally the background of
the mining law relating to the location of mining claims. The first
mining law was set forth in the acts of July 4, 1866' and July 26,
1866.2 These laws basically enacted and made legal the customs
and self-made rules and regulations of the prospectors in the days
*Member, Colorado Bar; B.S.C., Magna cum laude, University of Notre Dame, 1955;
LL.B., cum laude, University of Denver, 1957; in private practice.
1 14 Stat. 86 (1866), 30 U.S.C. § 21 (1965).
2 14 Stat. 251 (1866).
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of the Gold Rush in 1849. Until these acts all prior mining claims
were technically trespasses upon the public domain. The Placer Act
of 1870' brought non-lode claims under the mining law. A lode
claim is one based upon a discovery of "veins or lodes of quartz or
other rock in place"4 bearing valuable deposits. A placer claim is
based upon a discovery of deposits excepting veins of quartz or
other rock in place." The pending oil shale claims are based upon
placer locations. Whether oil shale is more susceptible to lode
claims than placer is, therefore, moot unless the government attacks
the claims on this basis, which so far has not been alleged. The
act of 18728 basically re-enacted the acts of 1866 and 1870 and is
the last general mining law enacted by Congress. Other particular
statutes will be commented on hereafter, but what determines the
validity of a mining claim is controlled by these acts.
The most important fact to be proven in establishing a valid
mining claim is a discovery. The historic test of what constitutes a
discovery is "where minerals have been found and the evidence is
of such a character that a person of ordinary prudence would be
justified in the further expenditure of his labor and means, with a
reasonable prospect of success, in developing a valuable mine."
This was the prudent man test set forth by the Secretary of the
Interior in Castle v. Womble,' and affirmed by the Supreme Court
in Chrisman v. Miller8 and Cameron v. United States.' The interpretation and application of this test to oil shale claims will be discussed
hereinafter.
With the discovery there must be a location of the claim in
accordance with the federal mining law as supplemented by state
law. This includes the staking of the claim's boundaries, the posting
of a location notice, recording location certificates, the performance
of required discovery development work, and such matters as may
be required under the law of the particular state. In this discussion
it will be presumed that claims are properly located, although questions may exist respecting proper location of many claims.
Once there is a valid discovery and proper location, a mining
claim, in the language of the Supreme Court, is "real property in
" 16 Stat. 217 (1870), 30 U.S.C.
4 17 Stat. 91 (1872),

§ 35 (1965).

30 U.S.C. § 23 (1965).

5 16 Stat. 217 (1870), 30 U.S.C. § 35 (1965).
6 17 Stat. 91 (1872), 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1965).
7 19 Land Dec. 455 (1894).
8197 U.S. 313 (1905).
9252 U.S. 450 (1920).
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the highest sense."1 Legal title to the land remains in the United
States, but a valid, equitable, and possessory title is in the claimant,
subject to taxation, capable of being transferred by deed or devise,
and otherwise possessing the incidents of ownership of real property.
There is no present requirement that a mining claimant ever apply
for a patent from the United States. In fact, until an application
for a patent is filed, there is no requirement that notice of the claim
be recorded other than by posting on the claim and in the county
records. Thus, the United States Government may not even know
of the existence of the claim. However, until a patent is obtained,
the unpatented claim must be maintained in accordance with the
mining law.
The principal requirement under the law to maintain a claim
is the performance of annual labor on the claim.1 The federal
requirement is supplemented by state laws concerning recording
affidavits of annual assessment work, but the controlling question
is whether the work is performed. If a claimant fails to perform
such annual labor, the land becomes subject to relocation, and if
validly relocated, the claim is extinguished, or the real property
interest of the prior claimant terminates. Until a relocation is made,
however, the prior claim is valid even though the assessment work
is not performed, unless the claim is abandoned.
Thus, relocation and abandonment are the only means by which
an unpatented claim may be lost under the archaic mining law.
The historic test of abandonment is "intent to abandon." All lawyers
know the difficulty in proving intent in any situation. The failure
of a claimant to perform annual labor may be considered in the
factual question of intent to abandon but is not controlling.
The important distinction to be remembered between relocation
and abandonment is that a valid relocation after the failure to perform assessment work extinguishes the prior claim as a matter of
law, whereas, in the case of abandonment, the failure to perform
annual labor is but one of the facts to be considered in proving
the requisite "intent to abandon."
This, in a nutshell, was the status of the mining law at the
time of the passage of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920,12 and as
to minerals other than oil shale and other leasing act minerals, is
the present status of the law.
10Forbes v.Gracey, 94 U.S. 762, 767 (1876).
1117 Stat. 92 (1872), 30 U.S.C. § 28 (1965).
1241 Stat. 437 (1920), 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-263 (1958).
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PARTICULAR STATUTES, ORDERS, AND DECISIONS HAVING
APPLICATION TO OIL SHALE CLAIMS BEING SUBJECT
TO THE MINING LAW

After the passage of the 1872 act, serious questions existed
as to whether the discovery of petroleum could be used as a basis
for a mining claim. This problem was resolved by the act of
February 11, 1897,"3 which provided, "Any person authorized to
enter lands under the mining laws of the United States may enter
and obtain patent to lands containing petroleum or other mineral
oils, and chiefly valuable therefor, under the provisions of the laws
relating to placer mineral claims." Natural uncertainty remained,
however, as to oil shale claims since this mineral is not, strictly
speaking, an oil. Shale oil is obtained from kerogen in the rock by
crushing and distillation. This uncertainty was eliminated on May
10, 1920, in Instructions from the First Assistant Secretary of the
Department of the Interior, wherein he stated:
Oil shale having been thus recognized by the Department and by
Congress as a mineral deposit and a source of petroleum, and having
been demonstrated elsewhere to be a material of economic importance, lands valuable on account thereof must be held to have been
subject to valid location and appropriation under the placer mining
laws, to the same extent and subject to the same provisions and
conditions as if valuable on account of oil or gas . . .14

Pursuant to such instructions, the first oil shale patent issued for
the La Paz claims Numbers 1 to 14, inclusive. 5
The claims theretofore located were protected in the passage
of the Mineral Leasing Act of February 25, 1920, by Section 37
of such act,'" which provided:
That the deposit of... oil shale. . shall be subject to disposition
only in the form and manner provided in this act, except as to
valid claims existent at the date of the passage of this act and
thereafter maintained in compliance with the laws under which
initiated, which claims may be perfected under such laws, including
discovery.

III.

HISTORY OF OIL SHALE CLAIMS PRIOR TO
PENDING CASES AND CONTESTS

The oil shale claims were originally located from 1916 to
February 25, 1920. On that date the Mineral Leasing Act became
effective and oil shale was designated as a leasing act mineral."
1329 Stat. 526 (1897).

Land Dec. 548 (1920).
15Mineral Entry Glenwood Springs-015847
1447

Management).
1641 Stat. 451 (1920),

30 U.S.C. § 193 (1965).
1741 Stat. 445 (1920), 30 U.S.C. § 241 (1965).

(Denver Land Office, Bureau of Land
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As noted above, Section 37 of the act contained a savings clause
protecting claims existing as of that date and perfected and maintained in accordance with the law. The claims protected under the
savings clause are those which are involved in the present controversies. No claims were located subsequent to 1920 because the
Mineral Leasing Act in effect withdrew the lands from a location
based on a discovery of oil shale.
One result of this was to eliminate the penalty of relocation
for failure to perform annual assessment work, unless the relocation
was based on the discovery of minerals other than leasing act minerals. As a practical matter, the penalty of relocation has been
eliminated since no significant discovery of non-leasing act minerals
has been made in the area.
After the passage of the Mineral Leasing Act, annual labor
was not performed on many of the claims. Whether the reasons
were that the penalty of relocation was removed or that the
locators did not care to perform the work and maintain the claims,
may never be known since most of the original locators are now
dead. The Department of the Interior, however, from 1927 to
1933, brought numerous contest proceedings to cancel claims on
the basis of failure to perform assessment work. The authority of
the United States to contest the validity of a mining claim at any
time before patent is clear.18 Unless an application for patent
pursuant to a mineral entry has been filed with the Bureau of Land
Management, however, the procedure for contesting the claims is
difficult. The United States, as the moving party, must determine
the name of the claim, its description, and the names of the owners.
The contests were commenced in accordance with Instructions of
February 26, 1916,"9 and the Rules of Practice then in effect."0 In
most cases, notices of the contest were mailed to the parties by
registered mail. In many cases notices were not mailed to all owners
and in some cases the notices were not addressed to any of the
owners. In such cases, the Department of the Interior has admitted
notice was improper.2 '
Almost all of the contests were based on failure to perform
assessment work. In most cases, no answers or appearances were
made by the mining claimants and decisions declaring the claims
null and void were issued.
18 Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450 (1920); Ickes v. Virginia-Colo. Dev. Corp.,
295 U.S. 639 (1935).
1944 Land Dec. 572 (1916).

2 51 Land Dec. 547 (1926).
21 Union Oil Co. of Cal. A-29560 (Supp.) GFS, SO-1965-41.
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Some claimants did appear and appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court, in the case of Wilbur v. Krushnic in 1930,22
and, to clarify a point, in Ickes v. Virginia-Colorado Development
Corporation in 1935,' held that the Interior Department could not
declare a claim void for failure to do assessment work since the
only penalty under the law was relocation.
Shortly thereafter, in a departmental decision in The Shale Oil
Company,2' which case had been suspended pending the Supreme
Court decision, the following statement appears:
In view of this opinion of the court, the adverse proceedings and
decision of the Commissioner therein, in the instant case, must be
held as without authority of law, and void. The above-mentioned
decision of the Department in the Virginia-Colorado Development
Corporation case and the instructions of June 17, 1930 are hereby

recalled and vacated. The above-mentioned decisions in the cases
of Francis D. Weaver and Federal Oil Shale Company and other

Departmental decisions in conflict with this decision are hereby
overruled.
For a number of years after these decisions, no significant
departmental or court cases arose concerning the problem. The
general opinion among many attorneys was that the original department decisions voiding claims for failure to do assessment work
were void also, which opinion was shared by officers within the
Department of the Interior. In fact, patents subsequently issued
on some claims which had been declared void prior to the 1935
decision of the Supreme Court.25
The limbo continued to exist until the passage of Public Law
585, commonly known as the Multiple Use Act, in 1954.6 Section 7
of this act2" established a procedure under which a lessee of a United
States oil and gas lease could institute an action to verify the title
under such lease. This is necessitated since the mining claimant, if
the claim is valid, would own the full equitable title, including oil
and gas. Although the Multiple Use Act was enacted to clarify
problems between unpatented uranium claims and conflicting federal oil and gas leases, its provisions clearly apply to all unpatented
claims. Various proceedings under Section 7 of Public Law 585 have
been commenced, many of which concerned conflicts with unpatented
oil shale claims. However, no significant decisions were issued
since most of the proceedings were settled with the mining claimants
22 280 U.S. 306 (1930).
- 295 U.S. 639 (1935).
2455 Interior Dec. 287 (1935).
25 Schmidt, Status of Unpatented Claims, QUARTERLY
MINES, July 1964, p. 125.
2668 Stat. 708 (1954), 30 U.S.C. § 521 (1958).
268
Stat. 711 (1954), 30 U.S.C. § 527 (1965).

OF THE COLORADO SCHOOL OF
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prior to hearing by means of protective leases from the claimants
or options for leases. Assuming the regularity of the proceeding, if
a mining claimant failed to file a verified statement within the time
allowed during such a proceeding, it is clear that the claimant has
lost all rights to leasing act minerals,' and consequently, in the case
of oil shale, the claimant will have lost his claim.
In connection with the passage of Public Law 585, however,
one significant case did arise. In 1954, Union Oil Company applied
for patent on numerous oil shale placer claims. The proceedings
had progressed to the point where a final certificate had been issued
to Union and only the issuance of patent remained. However, no
action had been taken by a lessee of a federal oil and gas lease
covering the same lands. Another oil company which had control
of this lease challenged Union's right to a patent. The Secretary
of the Interior decided that Union would be required to bring contest
proceedings to cancel the lease before patent could issue.' There
had been a flurry of general oil and gas activity in the area, but by
the time of the Secretary's decision, the oil and gas lessee had lost
interest in the area. However, when Union appealed to the district
court, the Secretary of the Interior stayed in the fight. The decisions
of both the district court" and the court of appeals31 affirmed the
Secretary's decision requiring the contest proceedings.
This decision is most significant, not in its holdings, but in the
change in attitude of the Department of the Interior which resulted
thereby. Prior to this case, patents were being issued on oil shale
claims; subsequently, to this author's knowledge, no oil shale patents
have been issued and attempts to obtain the same have been strongly
resisted by the Department of the Interior. This brings us to the
current status of constipation.
IV.

DECISION OF SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

ON APRIL 17, 1964

On February 16 and 23, 1962, the Manager of the Denver
Land Office of the Bureau of Land Management issued decisions
rejecting mineral patent applications on some 257 oil shale placer
claims. No hearings were conducted on the merits of the claims,
e.g., valid location and discovery. The Manager's decisions were
based on the grounds that the claims had been declared null and
void in contest proceedings initiated from 1927 to 1931, and that
Stat. 711 (1954), 30 U.S.C. § 527(b) (1965).
Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Calvert, 65 Interior Dec. 245 (1958).
3
0 Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Seaton, Civil No. 3042-58, D.D.C. (1960).
31 Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Udall, 289 F.2d 790 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
2868
2
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under the "principles of finality of administrative action, estoppel
by adjudication, and res judicata," the prior decisions in the contests
could not now be challenged. All of the prior decisions involved
were of the type discussed above, wherein the Government in the
earlier contest proceedings had alleged failure to perform assessment work. All of the prior decisions had been issued before the
Suprme Court decision in Ickes v. Virginia-Colorado Development
Corporation.3 Some of the contests had been commenced prior to
the Krushnic case, but apparently new contest proceedings were
commenced after the Krushnic case. 3
Twenty-seven different appeals were taken to the Director,
Bureau of Land Management, from the Manager's decisions. Such
appeals were considered together by the Secretary of the Interior,
who assumed supervisory jurisdiction. In Union Oil Company of
34 decided on April 17, 1964, the Secretary affirmed
California,
the Manager's decisions on the principles of res judicata, finality
of administrative action, and laches. The Manager and Secretary
both held that the earlier decisions in the contest proceedings could
not now be challenged, even though possibly incorrect as a matter
of law. The Secretary's decision of April 17, 1964, relied heavily
on the fact that the opinion in The Shale Oil Company" case in
1935, which was issued after the Virginia-Colorado" decision of the
Supreme Court, merely overruled certain cases and specifically
vacated and recalled other cases. By overruling cases, the Secretary
contends such cases merely lose their precedent and authority for
future decisions, but the decisions in such cases are not affected.
The decision of April 17, 1964, also relies heavily on the
decision of the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia in Gabbs
Exploration Company v. Udall.7 The Gabbs case parallels the
factual situation of the earlier contest proceedings used as a basis
for the April 17 decision with one important exception. The original
notice of contest in the Gabbs case, in addition to alleging failure
to perform assessment work, also alleged abandonment. Thus, the
earlier Gabbs decision would not be incorrect as a matter of law
under the Virginia-Colorado case, since the Government may challenge unpatented claims on the basis of abandonment as stated in
the Virginia-Coloradocase. 8
32295 U.S. 639 (1935).
33 280 U.S. 306 (1930).
34 71 Interior Dec. 169 (1964).
35 55 Interior Dec. 287 (1935).
36295 U.S. 639 (1935).
37 315 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 822 (1963).
38 295 U.S. 639 (1935).
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The decision of the court of appeals in the Gabbs case does,
however, lend some authority to the doctrines of res judicata and
finality of administrative action asserted by the Secretary in his
decision of April 17, 1964, but the Gabbs case does not cite any
court authority in this respect. 9
The Secretary's decision of April 17, 1964, considered the
question of notice in the prior contest proceedings. As to some
claims it held the notice proper and the decision was final. As to
other claims, the finality of the decision was held in abeyance pending a determination of the sufficiency of notice of contest in the
early proceedings. Such determination has now been made and is
set forth in the supplemental decision in Union Oil Company of
California, decided July 30, 1965.40 The supplemental decision
upholds service of notice by registered mail, with the proof thereof
being a return receipt signed by the owner of the claims or his
authorized agent, if such authorization is in writing. The decision
adds to the constipation by declaring fractional interests in some
claims cancelled and other fractional interests in the same claims
not cancelled. The supplemental decision does not, however, change
the basis of the April 17, 1964, decision and considers only the notice
question.
V.
APRIL

APPEALS OF DECISIONS OF

17, 1964,

AND JULY

30, 1965

Several appeals were immediately prosecuted to the United
States District Court for the District of Colorado after the April 17,
1964, decision. Additional appeals can now be expected after the
supplemental decision of July 30, 1965.
In The Oil Shale Corporation, et al., v. Udall,4 the Government filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the complaint
failed to state a claim and was premature since the plaintiff had
not exhausted its administrative remedies, that the primary authority
in the matter was in the Secretary of the Interior, and that the
United States was an indispensable party. The motion to dismiss
was denied by Judge William E. Doyle on November 27, 1964.42
Thereafter, the Government filed its answer including the same
grounds as were included in the motion to dismiss, and in addition
alleged laches, estoppel, res judicata, and finality of administrative
action. The government's answer curiously alleges therefore both
that the plaintiffs are too early by not exhausting their administrative
39 315 F.2d 37, 40-41 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
40
A-29560 (Supp.) GFS, SO-1965-41.
41 Civ. Act. No. 8680, U.S.D.C., Colo. (pending).
42 235 F. Supp. 606 (D. Colo. 1964).
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remedies and too late by reason of laches and estoppel. It is possible
that either or both of these grounds will ultimately prove successful.
The typical type of relief sought in the appeals is that prayed
for in Napier v. Udall." The plaintiffs in this case seek a mandatory order requiring the Secretary of the Interior to process the
patent application and take such action as is necessary to issue
the patent, as well as orders declaring the early contest decision
null and void and the Manager's decision of February 16, 1962,
and Secretary's decision of April 17, 1964, invalid.
If the Secretary of the Interior is successful in defending these
appeals, and it is a sure thing that such success will only be achieved
after action or denial of review by the Supreme Court, the problem
as to claims involved in the appeals will be resolved. If, however,
the Secretary's decision is reversed, all of these claims will then be
remanded to the Manager's office for hearings on the merits of the
claims. The position of the Secretary in such hearings, as well as in
hearings on claims not declared invalid by reason of improper
notice, is indicated by additional directions of the Secretary.
VI.

SECRETARY'S MEMORANDUM

OF APRIL 17,

1964

On the same date the Secretary issued his decision in Union
Oil Company of California, et al.," the Secretary also issued a
Memonrandum to the Director, Bureau of Land Management concerning the determination of rights to outstanding unpatented oil
shale mining claims. The Bureau of Land Management was directed
to determine all remaining claims, and as to those which were not
the subject of contests or patent applications, to initiate contest
proceedings to test the adequacy of discovery, and to assert any
ground for contest which might be justified by the facts. The Secretary directed that to qualify as valid, the discovery must have been
such, on the date it was made, as would justify a person of ordinary
prudence in the further expenditure of labor and means, with
reasonable prospect of success, in developing a valuable mine. This
is the historic test of a discovery as noted above.' However, the
application of the test is contrglling. In this connection, the following is quoted from the Secretary's Memorandum:
4. In applying the test of discovery, the Bureau should observe
the following guidelines:
a) The fact that any given deposit of oil shale may
be a valuable resource for future use does not render the
Act. No. 8691, U.S.D.C., Colo. (pending).
" 41 Interior Dec. 169 (1964).
5Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450 (1920); Crisman v. Miller, 197 U.S. 313
(1905); Castle v. Womble, 19 Land Dec. 445 (1894).
43Civ.
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discovery valid under the mining laws unless a person
of ordinary prudence would be justified in the further
expenditure of labor and means with the reasonable prospect of developing a valuable mine;
b) The finding or exposure of an isolated bit of
mineral or quantities of low-grade mineral, not connected
with or leading to valuable mineral deposits, will not in
itself be considered a sufficient discovery;
c) The mineral deposit actually found or exposed
by the locator must itself have been of such character
as to meet the test of discovery without regard to other
.physical evidence or information not obtained from within the boundaries of the claim from which the existence
of substantial values beneath the surface may be inferred.
5. In further contest proceedings, the Bureau will raise the
question of the economic or commercial value of oil shale, as of
the time the claims were located, as one of the elements in the
application of the standard test of discovery discussed above. The
lack of any economically or commercially feasible method of extraction and production of shale oil from oil shale is a relevant, although
not necessarily decisive, consideration in determining whether a
discovery was made. In this regard, the mere showing of an outcrop
of the Mahogany Ledge, in circumstances which heretofore have
provided the basis for patent, will no longer be accepted as prima
facie evidence of compliance with the requirements of the mining
laws. This does not mean that the claimant is required to demonstrate the immediate marketability of oil shale as in the case of
certain non-metallic minerals of widespread or common occurrence.
It is noted that the Secretary cited authority in other parts of his
Memorandum, but cited no authority in the above quoted parts of
the Memorandum. There is no real objection to this since the
"guidelines" are now established for the future, except the increased
constipation which will result therefrom.
The guidelines, by their own admission, conflict with the past
application of the test of discovery. The general rule of discovery
in oil shale claims heretofore followed by the Department of the
Interior was set forth in the case of Freeman v. Summers." The test
to be applied hereafter apparently is set forth in the Secretary's
Memorandum quoted above. As noted above, the Instructions of
May 10, 1920, from the First Assistant Secretary of the Interior47
recognized the value of oil shale and authorized the issuance of
patents. No discoveries have been made since such date because the
Mineral Leasing Act of February 25, 1920, prohibited further locations. As early as 1916 the United States Geological Survey issued
regulations governing what would be considered valuable oil shale."
Such regulations included considerations of the depth of the shale
46

52 Land Dec. 201 (1927).

47 47 Land Dec. 548 (1920).
48

Cited in Empire Gas & Fuel Co., 51 Land Dec. 424, 429 (1926).
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from the surface, the thickness of the bed, and the ultimate yield
in gallons per ton of the shale discovered. The regulations were
later revoked as being possibly too strict.4" However, they did constitute a recognition by the Department of the Interior of the value
of oil shale. In effect, the Supreme Court decisions in the Krushnic0
and Virginia-Colorado Development Corporation" cases acknowledged discoveries prior to 1920 were sufficient under the mining
law, and, of course, the numerous patents heretofore granted were
based upon similar discoveries.
The Secretary's application of the test of discovery is not necessarily a new rule, but a new application of the rule to oil shale
claims. There have been numerous52 interpretations or constructions
of the so-called "prudent man" test.
The so-called "liberal rule" of construction is usually cited as
requiring only that a locator be able to establish that there was such
a discovery of mineral within the limits of his claim that would
justify an ordinarily prudent man, not necessarily a miner, in expending his time and money thereon in the further development of the
property. It should be noted that a purely literal interpretation of
this rule would not require the locator to submit any evidence as to
the potentially commercial and profit-making nature of his discovery
deposit.5" It is this rule which is most commonly applied in those
cases, arising in state courts, the purpose of which is to adjudicate
rights of possession between conflicting mineral locators.'
The so-called "strict rule" of construction requires that a
mineral locator be able to establish mineralization within the limits
of his claim to an extent which would make the land more valuable
for the purpose of removing and marketing minerals than for any
other purpose. Such a rule necessarily seems to imply that the
locator be able to establish that his claim can be worked at a profit
or that the quantity and quality of his mineral discovery be "in
paying quantities." This rule has been applied, either expressly
or impliedly, in proceedings involving a contest between an agricultural and a mineral entry, 5 a contest between a placer and lode
49

Pitcher v. Jones, 71 Utah 453, 267 Pac. 184 (1928) ; 36 AM. JUR. Mines & Minerals
§ 87 (1938).
50280 U.S. 306 (1930).
51 295 U.S. 639 (1935).
52 Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450 (1920) ; Crisman v. Miller, 197 U.S. 313
(1905) ; Castle v. Womble, 19 Land Dec. 445 (1894).
53 3 LINDLEY, MINES § 336 (3d ed. 1914).
54
Pitcher v. jones, 71 Utah 453, 267 Pac. 184 (1928) ; 36 AM. JUR. Mines & Minerals § 87.
55
Davis's Administrator v. Weibold, 139 U.S. 507 (1891).
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deposit, s" applications for patent,57 and in actions brought by the
United States to contest the validity of a location 5 or to set aside
a patented claim on the basis of fraud."9
The rule generally applied by the Department of the Interior
in patent applications until recent years appears to be reflective of
a more general rule sufficiently broad to encompass both the liberal
and strict constructions. Such rule may be stated as requiring that
a locator find mineral in mass so placed that he can follow a vein
or other mineral deposit with reasonable hope and assurance that
he will ultimately develop a paying mine."0 For a comprehensive
analysis of the problems of discovery, see Title IV of the American
Law of Mining (1964).
The sole conclusion to be derived concerning the new guidelines established as to oil shale discoveries is that if the discoveries
are not deemed valid, another decision of the United States Supreme
Court will be required.
Before leaving a discussion of the Secretary's Memorandum
of April 17, 1964, it is noted that although the question of discovery
is primarily discussed therein, the Secretary also directed the Bureau
of Land Management to assert any other ground for contest which
might be justified by the facts. The Secretary's supplemental decision
in Union Oil Company of California,et al."' indicates other grounds
which will be asserted. The following is quoted therefrom.
It should be noted that, as to cases hereinafter remanded for further action and processing by the Bureau of Land Management, this
decision is not intended to be the final administrative determination
of the possessory rights now claimed by the patent applicants. The
patent applications have yet to be examined by the Bureau for the
purpose of determining, among other things, whether locations

were validly made, whether the claims were validly maintained, and
whether the claims were abandoned ....

The Bureau must also determine, assuming the claims are otherwise valid, whether the present patent applicants have acquired all

of the outstanding uncancelled possessory interests in the claims
for which they seek patents. Specifically, there remains open the
question whether the Department is bound to accept a State Court's

determination regarding the relative rights of possession of alleged
co-owners of an association placer claim ....

If it is not bound by such decisions, an additional question to be
56
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United States v. Iron Silver Mining Co., 128 U.S. 673 (1888).

Royal K. Placer, 13 Land Dec. 86 (1891).
58 United States v. Dawson, 58 Interior Dec. 670 (1944).
59 1 RICKErrs, AMERICAN MINING LAW § 598 (4th ed. 1943)_
60Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450 (1920); United States v. Minnilee Baker,
60 Interior Dec. 241 (1948); Freeman v. Summers, 52 Land Dec. 201 (1927);
Montana Copper Mines Co., 41 Land Dec. 320 (1921) ; 1 RICKErrs, AMERICAN
MINING LAW § 597 (4th ed. 1943).
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determined is whether the Department will recognize an asserted
title to an association placer oil shale mining claim where the
patent applicant's title is based in part on interests allegedly
acquired since 1920 by means of forfeiture notices published in
accordance with Rev. Stat. 2324 (30 U.S.C. 28) (1958 ed.).

Thus, slowly but surely, the battle lines are being drawn. It is clear
that once hearings on the merits are conducted, the factual presentations in each case will be of great importance, and the probable
court review of the denials of patent applications and the ultimate
decisions therein will, in themselves, be a comprehensive analysis
of the entire mining law.
VII.

GENERAL SUMMARY AS TO OIL SHALE DEVELOPMENT

As commented upon earlier herein, no binding authority is cited,
the reasons being evident. This article merely brings the problem
up to date since an excellent article on the subject in DICTA in 1950.6
Since that time, a significant change may be noted in the position
of the Department of the Interior. The changes may be summarized
as follows:
1. The Department now takes a position that the claims
were cancelled in the early proceedings if notice was
proper. This on the surface would appear to be consistent.
2. However, the Department did not take this position at
all times since 1935, as evidenced by the issuance of
patents since such date on claims previously declared
null and void.
3. The Department's test of discovery to be applied in
future patent applications is inconsistent with that previously applied in Freeman v. Summers."
Lest a reader think the Government's position seems arbitrary and
capricious, a few further comments are necessary. This article was
requested to represent both views, i.e., that of the Government and
that of the claimant. Since this is more of a factual history than
a citation of legal authorities, some more facts should be emphasized.
With few exceptions, most of the claims involved in the present
proceedings were acquired after 1935 by the persons or parties now
seeking patents. Such acquisitions were made with the record showing the prior decisions declaring the claims null and void, and
consequently, with full knowledge of the possible invalidity of the
6227 DICTA 195 (1950).
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claims. No significant development of the properties has yet been
made. Consequently, if the mining claimants win, they will have
obtained title to thousands of acres of valuable lands for doing
nothing from 1920 to the middle 1950's except the nominal work
required for patent. 4 After 1955, admittedly the claimants will
have expended large sums for attorneys' fees.
As a result, this author has no objection to the Government's
contesting the validity of the claims. The objection is to the procedure being followed by the Government in not having hearings
on all aspects of the particular cases at one time. The Manager's
decisions in February 1962 now have been reversed in part and
affirmed in part. Some claimants must now appeal to the courts
for the right to have a hearing on the merits, while at the same
time, the Government is preparing new attacks which will require
additional court appeals if the Manager's decisions of 1962 are
ultimately reversed. Maybe logically the Government could respond
that since nothing was done from 1920 to 1955, what is the big
hurry now. The answer to this is simply that oil shale can not be
developed until this problem is resolved, and the Government should
encourage the orderly development of our natural resources, and
not be in a position of constipating it by its own action.
If the ultimate decisions are reached on the basis of principles
of law, the claimants appear to have the better position. If, however, the ultimate decisions are based on principles of equity, such
as laches and estoppel, the Government may win if it does not by
its new actions create such inequities as would, under the old
maxim, prevent it from coming into court "with clean hands."

" 221 Stat. 61 (1880), 43 Stat. 144 (1925), 30 U.S.C. § 29 (1965).

